It should come as no surprise to constitutionalists, practitioners under the Federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§3729–3733) (FCA), and auditors of the oral argument in the case that the Supreme Court has held that the federal government may move to dismiss an FCA action under §3730(c)(2)(A) whenever it has intervened—whether during the seal period or later on. United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc. To assert this right, the government must actually intervene (which is not difficult since the statute allows it at any time before final judgment, even on appeal), and the propriety of dismissal is to be adjudicated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a), the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits in ordinary civil litigation, and dismissal should be granted in all but the most extraordinary cases.
Blog Editors
Recent Updates
- Watch: DOJ’s New Self-Disclosure Rules: Decide Fast or Lose the Credit – Speaking of Litigation
- AI Medical Technology Meets IP Law in Patent Infringement Suit
- DOJ Civil Division Announces Accelerated Review of FCA Whistleblower Complaints Involving Federally Funded, State-Administered Benefits Programs
- Washington Amends CEMA: Plaintiffs Rush to File Actions Before June 11, 2026 Effective Date
- Five Cases Health Care and Life Sciences GCs Should Keep Watching in 2026