Commercial Litigation Update

Generative Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) tools like ChatGPT, Scribe, Jasper, and others have catapulted exponentially in popularity in recent years, for widespread personal and professional uses supplementing, if not largely displacing, traditional search engines. Applications for AI interactions in the workplace, algorithmically simulating human reasoning and inference, are expanding as quickly as users can draft new prompts requesting designs, how-to guides, correspondence, and countless other outputs. AI tools have quickly transitioned from an amusing new technology to essential tools for professionals and businesses, driving innovation and efficiency. These tools are used by businesses for an ever-expanding list of purposes, including brainstorming ideas based on patterns and data analysis; creating and memorializing documents, procedures, manuals, and tutorials; generating marketing and other client-facing materials; drafting communications; summarizing documents; explaining concepts and processes; and even generating code.

As these tools become more integrated into workplace processes, courts and litigants are beginning to confront the question of whether and to what extent AI searches and “chats” are discoverable in litigation. As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit broad discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, litigants may potentially be entitled to compel production of information and communications generated or processed by AI platforms related to the facts in dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); In re OpenAI, Inc., Copyright Infringement Litig., No. 23-CV-08292, 2025 WL 1652110, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2025). Just as local news headlines are replete with instances of internet searches as evidence in criminal cases[1], real-time AI “interactions” may likely be subject to the same disclosure requirements in civil litigation.

On Monday, March 3, 2025, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) heard argument in Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc., regarding whether the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act, G. L. c. 149, § 24L (the “MNAA”), applies to a forfeiture-for-solicitation provision contained in a termination agreement. The outcome of this appeal will clarify the bounds of the recently enacted statute and may have a significant impact on the landscape of restrictive covenants in Massachusetts on the whole.

This appeal challenges the Superior Court’s July 2024 ruling that a contract provision requiring Plaintiff-Appellee to forfeit severance benefits upon breach of non-solicitation obligations was subject to, and prohibited by, the MNAA because it does not satisfy the requirements for an enforceable noncompetition agreement under the statute. The MNAA requires valid covenants to be reasonable in scope of proscribed activities in relation to the interests protected, supported by mutually agreed upon consideration, and consonant with public policy. G. L. c. 149, § 24L.

Drawing from established precepts of Massachusetts law that a judge may fill in an omitted contractual term consistent with the intent of the parties, a Massachusetts Appeals Court recently affirmed a trial court’s conclusion that the parties had agreed to commission payments for an indefinite period of time and as a result, the payments would continue for as long as the Defendant continued receiving revenue from the underlying customer.

In Prism Group, Inc. v. Slingshot Technologies Corporation, a dispute arose between Slingshot  Technologies Corp. (“Slingshot”) and Prism Group (“Prism”), a one-person sales company Slingshot engaged to procure customers for Slingshot’s business of providing secure facsimile services in the healthcare industry. In email correspondence from the establishment of two customer accounts in question, the parties agreed that Prism would receive a commission of a percentage of the revenue Slingshot received from customers Prism brought in. At issue in this dispute were two lucrative client relationships that generated $9 million and $29 million for Slingshot, respectively. Despite Prism undisputedly completing its performance under the contracts, and Slingshot originally agreeing in email correspondence to pay Prism a set percentage of the revenues generated from these clients, Slingshot reduced and ultimately stopped paying Prism any commission, despite the ongoing nature of the underlying customer relationships.