Contrary to the presupposition of many, the U.S. Supreme Court did not render a decision on Friday resolving the question of the president’s authority to impose tariffs through executive orders and related questions concerning the extent to which congressional mandates should be required.
Instead, the Court issued a 5–4 decision in the case of Bowe v. United States. Resolving a substantial split among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court held, per Justice Sotomayor, that a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requiring federal courts to dismiss certain previously raised habeas corpus claims applies only to state prisoners’ applications.
Michael Bowe had pleaded guilty in 2008 to various Hobbs Act robbery and firearms violations committed in conjunction with a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The grounds for Bowe’s firearms conviction were later invalidated by decisions of the Supreme Court. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it could not grant Bowe’s request for authorization to pursue habeas relief because of the AEDPA restriction, as it was held to apply to Bowe’s earlier, unsuccessful appeal. The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) require federal courts to dismiss a claim presented in “a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254” if it was presented in a prior application. Although Section 2254 covers habeas corpus applications filed by state prisoners, six circuit courts had held that the section also applied to habeas petitions filed by federal inmates under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Contrary to the government’s position, the Court held that it has jurisdiction over the case because 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar the Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. The law states that the denial of authorization “to file a second or successive application” shall not be the subject of a certiorari petition. But that provision does not apply to federal prisoners. It is housed within § 2244, which imposes several strict requirements that apply only to state prisoners. It also speaks only to a “second or successive application,” § 2244(b)(3)(E), but unlike state prisoners who file such applications, federal prisoners file motions and so can be distinguished.
Only three of the circuits had held that the law’s restriction only applied to state prisoners’ applications, but five Supreme Court Justices agreed with them. Each side of the divided Court claimed that the plain language of the statute dictated the result that it sought. The split was not, at least openly, a battle between judicial conservatives and liberals. Indeed, the Chief Justice and Justice Kavanaugh joined Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito issued a dissent, which Justice Barrett joined in part.
In sum, what is considered “plain language” should be read identically by everyone. Not so at the Supreme Court.