The DOJ’s New Corporate Enforcement Policy: A Familiar but Now Nationally Unified Framework for Voluntary Self-Disclosure

On March 10, 2026, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced its “first ever” department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (“CEP”) for all criminal cases.

The new CEP – which is modeled very closely upon the prior DOJ Criminal Division policy– creates a nationalized policy for how DOJ awards companies cooperation credit for self-disclosure. It incentivizes companies to voluntarily disclose discovered misconduct, cooperate with DOJ investigations, and timely and appropriately remedy discovered wrongdoing in exchange for credit – mainly through either a declination of prosecution or a non-prosecution agreement. 

Included in the new CEP is a flowchart of potential outcomes should a company choose to self-report.  Under this policy, well-intentioned companies will be rewarded for self-disclosing wrongdoing, cooperating with DOJ investigations, and remediating criminal misconduct.

Outcomes Under the New CEP

Self-Reports That Meet All Voluntary Self-Disclosure Requirements

Part I of the new CEP provides that the DOJ will decline to prosecute a company for criminal conduct where four factors are met:

1. First, the company must voluntarily self-disclose the misconduct to an appropriate DOJ criminal component.
2. Second, the company must fully cooperate with the DOJ’s investigation.
3. Third, the misconduct must be timely and appropriately remediated by the company.
4. Finally, for a self-report to meet the voluntary self-disclosure requirements, there cannot be aggravating circumstances.

Aggravating circumstances that could cause a self-report to fail to meet the requirements under Part I of the new CEP include, but are not limited to: the nature and seriousness of the offense, the egregiousness or pervasiveness of the misconduct within the company, and the severity of harm caused by the misconduct.  However, even where such aggravating circumstances may exist, prosecutors retain the discretion to recommend a CEP declination based on a holistic weighing of the severity of the aggravating circumstances against compliance with the first three factors of the voluntary self-disclosure requirements.

Self-Reports to DOJ in Good Faith

In certain circumstances, a company may fully cooperate with a DOJ investigation and timely and appropriately remediate the criminal conduct but nonetheless be ineligible for declination under Part I of the new CEP.  Ineligibility could arise from a self-report not qualifying as a voluntary self-disclosure as defined by the new policy,[1] or the existence of aggravating factors warranting a criminal resolution.  These circumstances are considered a “near miss” and are addressed under Part II of the new CEP.  Self-reports made in good faith that are a near-miss will still receive certain benefits under the new CEP, including a Non-Prosecution Agreement (absent particularly egregious aggravating circumstances), a term length of fewer than three years, no requirement of an independent compliance monitor, and a reduction of at least 50% but not more than 75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines fine range.

No Self-Report or Declination Inappropriate

If a company is not eligible under Part I or Part II of the new CEP, prosecutors maintain discretion to determine the appropriate resolution. Resolutions could ultimately still include a reduction in fine, but according to the CEP, the company will not receive, and the DOJ will not recommend a reduction of more than 50% off the fine under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The prosecutors’ discretion also extends to the form, term length, and compliance obligations of an appropriate resolution.

Takeaways

Change in Scope

The most meaningful aspect of the new CEP is not a change in substance, but a change in scope.  Until now, the Department’s approach to voluntary self-disclosure developed through fragmented policies issued by Main Justice’s Criminal Division,  and a handful of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices nationwide.  Although those policies often reflected similar principles, they were not uniform.  Companies confronting potential misconduct therefore had to navigate a patchwork of guidance when assessing whether—and how—to disclose conduct to the government.

The new CEP replaces that fragmented framework with a single Department-wide policy applicable to nearly all DOJ criminal components, except the Antitrust Division.  For the first time, companies now face a single set of expectations governing most corporate criminal matters across the Department.

Increased Transparency

At the same time, the policy continues DOJ’s recent effort to make the benefits of voluntary self-disclosure more explicit and to incentivize corporate participation, while signifying DOJ’s shift towards not prosecuting corporations criminally.  Earlier versions of the Criminal Division’s CEP offered companies that satisfied the policy’s requirements only a “presumption” of declination.  In May 2025, DOJ’s Criminal Division revised that language to provide that prosecutors “will” decline prosecution when those conditions are met and no aggravating circumstances are present.  The new CEP retains that formulation and extends it across DOJ components, reinforcing the Department’s effort to make the incentives for disclosure both clearer and more predictable.

Practical Implications for Companies and Counsel

The new CEP simplifies companies’ self-disclosure calculus and offers meaningful benefits to companies that comply with the policy.  As Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche emphasized in announcing the policy, “well-intentioned businesses know that, across the Department, they will be rewarded when they self-disclose wrongdoing, cooperate with our investigations, and remediate the misconduct.”[2]  Blanche, however, paired that assurance with an equally direct warning: “make no mistake—we will not hesitate to seek appropriate resolutions against companies and individuals alike that perpetrate white collar offenses.”  Although it remains to be seen how the new CEP will be applied in practice, the message is unambiguous: the Department has clarified and formalized the path to favorable treatment, but companies that fail to meet those expectations should expect a more traditional enforcement response.

For companies, the practical implications of the new CEP remain closely tied to internal compliance and investigative processes.  Greater clarity about the benefits of voluntary self-disclosure reduces uncertainty about DOJ’s expectations, but it also heightens the importance of detecting and investigating potential misconduct quickly enough to support timely disclosure decisions, and the importance of remediation when such misconduct is detected.  In practice, that requires corporate compliance functions that are capable of surfacing concerns promptly, preserving key facts, and supporting early internal investigations.  Companies should therefore consider whether their existing compliance and investigative processes are equipped to meet those demands.

Epstein Becker & Green, P.C. is equipped to advise companies on this changing landscape regarding voluntary self-disclosure and to navigate these requirements. If you have any questions, please contact the authors of this article, or the EBG attorney who regularly assists you.

Endnotes

[1] U.S. Dep’t of Just., Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, Appendix B (2026).  “For the purposes of the CEP, the Department defines voluntary self-disclosure as follows: 1. [t]he company must make a good faith disclosure of the misconduct to the appropriate Department component; 2. [t]he misconduct is not previously known to the Department; 3. [t]he company had no preexisting obligation to disclose the misconduct to the Department; 4. [t]he voluntary disclosure occurs prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; and 5. [t]he company discloses the conduct to the Department within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the misconduct, with the burden being on the company to demonstrate timeliness.”  Id. (citation modified).

[2] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 26-230, Department of Justice Releases First-Ever Corporate Enforcement Policy for All Criminal Cases (March 10, 2026), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-releases-first-ever-corporate-enforcement-policy-all-criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/A6FH-TFNJ].